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CLUB GOODS AND REGULATORY OPPORTUNISM: TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AND RULES OF ORIGIN FOR AUTOS
*CAROL M. BAST
INTRODUCTION

The twelve Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)' parties vary widely in
geographical location, level of economic development, political institutions, and
interconnectedness. The parties to the TPP include the three North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 2 parties, the United States, Canada, and Mexico; three
additional developed countries, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand; an advanced
economy, Singapore; two rapidly-growing economies, Vietnam and Peru; a wellto-do economy dependent on gas and oil, Brunei Darussalam (Brunei); and middle
income countries, Malaysia and Chile.3 The United States, Canada, and Mexico
have developed many integrated supply manufacturing chains as a result of
NAFTA.4 For Japan and the United States, TPP is the countries' first bilateral trade
agreement of this depth and breadth.
The twelve countries became signatories to TPP to take advantage of the
benefits that a regional trade agreement offers.6 In a way, being a party to TPP is
similar to joining an exclusive club and receiving the benefits of "club goods." 7
The detriment of not being a TPP member is being discriminated against in not
receiving the benefits of the club goods.8 Non-members may be tempted to use
opportunistic behavior to take advantage of the spillover benefit of the TPP
regulatory system even though they were not the intended recipients of TPP. TPP
members might assume that non-TPP parties will use regulatory opportunism to

*Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, University of Central Florida. J.D. New York Law
School 1982, University of Wisconsin, M.A. 1976, Kalamazoo College, B.A. 1974. Many thanks to
Gary N. Horlick for his guidance, comments, and suggestions.
1. Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/3,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc20l6d3 en.pdf.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1708(14), H.R. Doc. 103-159, 32
I.L.M. 289, 673 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
3. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: LIKELY IMPACT ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC INDUSTRY SECTORS 52-54, 56-59, 695-740 USITC Pub. 4607 (May

2016), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4607.pdf [hereinafter INT'L TRADE COMM'N].
4. Id. at 56.
5. Id.
6. See generally Regional Trade Agreements, THE ORGANISATION
OPERATION
&
DEVELOPMENT

FOR ECONOMIC CO(OECD),

http://www.oecd.org/tad/benefitlib/regionaltradeagreements.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
7. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 8.
8.

See infra footnotes 244-57 and accompanying text.
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benefit.9 The hypothesis of this article is that TPP will have an overall positive
effect on the auto and auto parts industry of the TPP parties and that TPP will have
a slightly negative effect on China, a non-member.
Part I of this article reviews the economic, political, and institutional
dimensions of a regional trade agreement. Part II describes the auto industry,
paying special attention to the auto industry in the United States. Part III provides
information on rules of origin in general and TPP rules of origin for autos in
particular. Part IV analyzes the effect of TPP on the auto industry.
I.

THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF A
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors,
sometimes referred to as the Detroit Three, still have a strong presence in the
United States.10 They have been joined by other car makers who import vehicles
1
into the United States and who manufacture foreign cars in the United States.' In
addition, the Detroit Three manufacture vehicles outside the United States, either
in their own plants or in partnership with foreign car makers, some of which are
imported into the United States.' 2 The global value chain is central to the
automotive sector in that auto components and the parts that make up each
3
component often originate from far-flung locations all over the world.'
A regional trade agreement has economic, political, and institutional
dimensions. TPP is an exercise in balancing domestic needs, which might demand
protectionist provisions, in the face of an increasingly global economy whose
foundation is trade liberalism.' 4 The United States representatives to TPP
negotiations kept interest groups in the United States in mind because of the
potential opposition interest groups could cause in Congress if they did not see
benefits for them under TPP.' 5 This part considers each of the three dimensions in
turn.

9. See infra footnotes 258-66 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Thomas H. Klier, From Tail Fins to Hybrids: How Detroit Lost Its Dominance,

2
PERSP.
ECON.
33
perspectives/2009/2qtr-klier.
11. Id. at 14.
12.

(2Q/2009),

https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-

Timothy J. Sturgeon & Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Crisis and Protection in the Automotive

Industry: A Global Value Chain Perspective 8 (World Bank Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 5060,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/357861468315545086/pdflWPS5060.pdf
2009),
[hereinafter Sturgeon & Van Biesebroeck].

13. Id. at 3.
14. World Bank Group, Trade Liberalization: Why So Much Controversy? In ECONOMIC
A
DECADE
OF
REFORM
135-36,
THE
1990s:
LEARNING
FROM
GROWTH
IN

http://wwwl.worldbank.org/prem/lessonsl990s/chaps/05-Ch5_kl.pdf
15. Eric Bradner, How secretive is the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, CNN (June 12, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/11 /politics/trade-deal-secrecy-tpp/.
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The economic dimension

The economic dimension of an international trade agreement ranks just above
the political dimension in criticality.' 6 Valuing the effects of TPP is extremely
difficult, even for economists. Much depends on how TPP is interpreted and
applied into the future. Economists and attorneys may spend many months
working up a regulatory impact assessment of a trade agreement ex ante;'7
however, an ex post regulatory impact assessment may differ significantly.' 8
The auto industry is a multi-national enterprise that is extremely
competitive. As a significant stakeholder, the auto industry will be performing its
own regulatory impact assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats. 20 The effect of the TPP on the auto industry has much to do with the rules
of origin.
The United States has both strengths and weaknesses in the automotive
industry; these strengths and weaknesses must be considered when evaluating the
effects that TPP might have on those industries. The United States strengths lie in
research and development, technology innovations, and a workforce with the
advanced skills used in certain phases and sectors of manufacturing.21 Portions of
the auto industry that are high-skilled and high-paying depend on the integration of
the United States auto industry into the global value chain.22
The United States vulnerability lies in lower-skill level manufacturing. 23 One
of the sensitive sectors for the United States is the automotive sector because of the
potential job loss in lower-skill level auto and auto component manufacturing. 24
The fear is that lower-skill level production of autos and auto components will
move to other countries that have lower labor costs. 25 However, well-meaning but
protectionist policies, if instituted by the United States, would likely result in
retaliatory action from international trading partners and loss of foreign direct

16.

SHIHOKO GOTO, THE TPP REMAINS KEY TO U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

(2015), available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-tpp-remains-key-to-us-engagement-theasia-pacific-region.
17. See DIEGO A. CERDEIRO, ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
(TPP)
ON
LATIN
AMERICA
AND
THE
CARIBBEAN
(LAC)
4,
17-19
(2016),

https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wpl6101.pdf
18. Id. at 19.
1 9. Wagner Cezar Lucato et al., Measure the Degree of Competitiveness for Auto Parts
Manufacturing Companies, 50 INT'L J. PRODUCTION RES. 5508, 5519-20 (2012).
20. Keith Head, How Will the TPP Affect the Auto Industry?, WORLD ECO. FORUM (Nov. 15,
2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/1 1/how-will-the-tpp-affect-the-auto-industry/.
21. Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, How Offshoring and Global Supply Chains
Enhance the US Economy, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS 5 (2016).

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. TPP Auto ROO Most Likely To Hurt Makers Of Less Complex Parts: Experts, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Jan. 21, 2016), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/tpp-auto-roo-most-likely-hurt-makersless-complex-parts-experts (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
25. Id.
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investment in the United States.26 As a result of the United States auto industry's
integration into the global value chain, protectionist moves by the United States
would be counter-productive by resulting in the loss of foreign investment and
high-skilled and high-paying auto industry jobs in the United States.2 7
China, a TPP non-party, Japan, and the United States, as TPP parties, all have
significant ties to the automotive industry. 28 A key question is what effect TPP will
have on the automotive industry of the three countries. The table below shows the
importance of total worldwide exports of cars and car parts for China, Japan, and
the United States as far as the top thirty export industries for those countries. 29 For
Japan and the United States, the car and car parts industries were among the top
thirty exporting industries, while only the car parts industry was among the top
thirty exporting industries for China. 30 When comparing exports to imports, one
sees that the exports and imports of car parts for China was nearly equal; 31 for
Japan, car exports were approximately nine times imports, and exports of car parts
were approximately five times imports; 32 for the United States, car exports were a
little more than one-third the amount of imports and car part exports were
approximately four-fifth of imports.3 3

26. Id.
27. Id. at 1-2.
28. ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEGLECTING MANUFACTURING; COMPARED
WITH OTHER NATIONS, U.S. HAS MORE IMPORT COMPETITION IN LEADING EXPORT INDUSTRIES 8, 10,

14 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/83495.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id
3 1. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Trade in cars and motor vehicle parts ranked by value of exports, 2013
(billions of dollars) 34
Country

Rank
of
export
8 of
30

HS
code

Description

export
s

imports

8708

Parts and
accessories for
motor vehicles

$25.5

Japan

1 of
30

8703

cars

Japan

3 of
30

8708

United
States

3 of
30

United
States

4 of
30

China

Import
ratio

$24.2

trade
balan
cc
$1.4

$91.7

$10.6

$81.1

11.6%

Parts and
accessories for
motor vehicles

$35.3

$7.1

$28.8

20.2%

8703

cars

$57.1

$155.7

$98.6

272.5%

8708

Parts and
accessories for
motor vehicles

$42.9

$58.9

$15.9

137.1%

94.7%

The TPP Rules of Origin for autos recognize 3 5 that the automotive industry is
critical for the economies of a number of the parties to the TPP as well as being
critical for non-members. One indication of the criticality of the trade in cars and
car parts is the convoluted nature of the extremely lengthy rules of origin for autos
with all their bewildering cross-references that were heavily debated; 36 another
indication of the critical nature of the auto industry to the economies of several
TPP countries is that the TPP provisions concerning autos were reportedly some of

34. SCoTr, supra note 28, at 8-15.
35. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 8.
36. See MARK Wu, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ROUNDTABLE ON AUTO MANUFACTURING
SUPPLY CHAIN, PREPARED REMARKS BEFORE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE - COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS, CONVENED BY DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS (January 11, 2016), available at
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/
Wu%20-%20TPP%20Roundtable%20on%20Autos%20-%2OJan%202016.pdf;
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS MINORITY STAFF REPORT 114TH CONGRESS, TPP
ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE IN THE AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAIN (Jan. 8, 2016),
available
at
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/T
PP%20Issue%20Analysis%20-%2OAutos.pdf [hereinafter TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE]; Reid
Whitten, The Trans Pacific Partnershipand the Auto Industry: Will Six Thousand Pages Pave the Way
for
Increased
Exports?,
GLOBAL
TRADE
LAW
BLOG
(Nov.
12,
2015),
http://www.globaltradelawblog.com/2015/11/12/the-trans-pacific-partnership-and-the-auto-industrywill-six-thousand-pages-pave-the-way-for-increased-exports/.
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the latest agreed upon in the negotiations.
The reason to implement TPP is in part due to its projected economic benefits.
Economists have long thought that integration of the markets of countries with
differences in labor costs, productivity, capital, and natural resources will result in
greater efficiency and growth;3 8 global value chains account for eighty percent of
international trade. 39 United States multi-national enterprises, such as automakers
and auto part suppliers use global supply chains to reduce labor costs, increase
productivity, and expand their shares of the global market. 40 TPP should produce
aggregate economic gains because of the wide variances in labor, capital, and
natural resources among the parties to TPP. 41 Another benefit of a regional trade
agreement may be in reducing non-tariff barriers. 42 The reality is that the welfare
of sensitive sectors of the United States economy, such as the auto industry, must
be balanced against an economically-sound trade system favored by most
43
economists.
B.

The PoliticalDimension

The political dimension is critical because it involves spending political
capital. A trade agreement involves giving up some sovereignty and the question is
to what extent. Each country must provide bargaining chips that can be used to
entice a needed concession from another signatory. A trade agreement can lock-in
domestic reforms; because it operates over the long term, it can provide stability
over many changes in government administration. A trade agreement can provide
shelter to a new government administration against pressure to change a domestic
reform made by a prior government administration; at the same time, a foreign
45
direct investor expects predictability based on the trade agreement.
After the United States becomes a signatory to a trade agreement, it must be
46
ratified by Congress to make it become part of the country's domestic law. The
United States is typically a standard-setter because of its large market share and the
recognition by other signatories that the trade agreement cannot become effective

37. TPP Rule of Origin is 45% for Vehicles, With Caveats; 35-45% for Auto Parts, INSIDE U.S.
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.bilaterals.org/?tpp-rule-of-origin-is-45-for [hereinafter TPP RULE OF

TRADE

ORIGIN is 45%].

38. David H. Autor, et al., The China Shock: Learningfrom Labor Market Adjustment to Large
Changes in Trade (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21906, 2016),
http://www.ddom.net/papers/Autor-Dom-Hanson-ChinaShock.pdf.
39. Moran & Oldenski, supranote 21.
40. Id.
41.

CERDEIRO, supra note 17, at 8-10.

42. Id. at 10.
43. Id. at 12.
44. John Whalley,

Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE
63, 71 (Jeffrey A. Frankel, ed. 1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7820.pdf.
45. Id
46. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-PacificPartnership:New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's
Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27, 44 (2011).
Why

REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
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without Congressional ratification. 7 A trade agreement is an opportunity with
advantages and disadvantages, but not ratifying can have advantages and
disadvantages as well. For ratification, the overall benefits of the trade agreement
must outweigh the constraints that the trade agreement imposes.
Entering into a trade agreement can involve a political cost. Ratification of a
trade agreement may involve a dominant industry championing the trade
agreement; a dominant industry being convinced not to oppose the trade
agreement; a government leader willing to place political capital at risk; or a
combination. For United States elections, the candidate typically uses rhetoric that
appeals to the ordinary citizen rather than to big business. 4 8 However, once elected,
government officials must keep businesses in mind when implementing policy to
keep the economy thriving; in other words, trade policy usually follows the money
trail. 49 Each member of Congress constantly monitors the member's voter base to
gauge whether the member's constituents are favorably or unfavorably inclined
toward a trade agreement scheduled to come up for a vote in Congress. 50
Politicians are extremely susceptible to pressure from constituents and interest
5

'

groups.
A trade agreement like the TPP stirs up politics in the United States because
of the domestic consequences it can have in restructuring the distribution chain in
the various manufacturing sectors, not the least being the auto industry. 52 An
interesting factor that plays into this is the openness of a country's economy.
Generally, a country has a more closed economy if its exports significantly exceed
its imports.53 China is considered a closed economy, as is Japan, although not to
the degree of China. 54 In contrast, the United States has an open economy, with its
imports exceeding exports in its top thirty export industries, thus leading to a trade
deficit.5 5 The trade deficit of the United States becomes a matter for political
discussion when the voter feels that domestic production is receiving "unfair"
competition from foreign imports and the United States is not exporting more
because of trade barriers erected by the same countries from which the United
47. Id. at 39.
48. New Survey Shows Majority Of Clinton Supporters Favor TPP, INSIDER TRADE (2016),
http://insidetrade.com/trade/new-survey-shows-majority-clinton-supporters-favor-tpp. For example, at
one campaign stop Hillary Clinton declared: "My message to every worker in Michigan and across
America is this. I will stop any trade deal that kills jobs or holds down wages, including the TransPacific Partnership." Id.
49. The Benefits of International Trade, THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
https://www.uschamber.com/intemational/intemational-policy/benefits-intemational-trade-0
(last visit
Dec. 5, 2016).
50. BRT: Anti-Trade Campaign Rhetoric Impacts Congressional Support For TPP, INSIDER
TRADE
(2016),
http://insidetrade.com/daily-news/brt-anti-trade-campaign-rhetoric-impactscongressional-support-tpp.
51.

52.
(Sep. 30,
53.
54.
55.

See generally INTN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3

Robert Scott, Trading Away the Manufacturing Advantage, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE
2013) http://www.epi.org/publication/trading-manufacturing-advantage-china-trade/.
ScOrr, supranote 28.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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56
States is receiving a high volume of imports. One economist opines that the trade

deficit in the United States "is a consequence of its toleration of massive currency
manipulation over many years by China, Japan, and about 20 other countries, the
failure to eliminate widespread tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. exports, and the
57
failure to develop effective strategies for rebuilding U.S. manufacturing."
United States national politics is always woven through the fabric of a trade
agreement in that a politician is conscious of how constituents in the politician's
district will react to the trade provisions that have an impact on the district. A
danger in the United States is that the average voter is not particularly wellinformed about international trade agreements and most of the information that the
58
average voter does have is from the sound-bytes captured by the news media.
These sound-bytes tend to oversimplify the potential effects of an international
trade agreement and characterize the agreement in positive or negative terms. One
simplification derived from the media is that, for the United States, domestic
production and export of United States-manufactured goods provides a benefit to
the country;59 another simplification from the media is that it is detrimental to the
United States' economy to import goods that compete with domestically-produced
goods, and United States multi-national enterprises that base a portion of their
production outside the United States are depriving the United States of needed
employment opportunities.60
A voter's task in understanding an international trade agreement is an onerous
one. TPP is no exception to this generalization. TPP is a massive document of
more than 600 pages, not including annexes, appendixes, and side letters, and its
effect is wide in its coverage of various subject matters.6 While trade liberalism
should result in gains, one might be a little cautious when analyzing the potential
effects of the new rules of origin for autos; the ex post effects are dependent on the
varying economic strengths of the various TPP signatories and the ability of auto
and auto component producers to utilize the extremely complicated rules of
origin.62
Members of Congress have available to them research services and can hear
from experts so that they can be advised on the effect of an international trade
agreement. Given that members of Congress are politicians, it is not unheard of
56.

Douglas Irwin, InternationalTrade Agreements, THE LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS & LIBERTY,

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/IntemationalTradeAgreements.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2016).
57. Id.
58.

Michael Tomz, DEMOCRATIC DEFAULT: DOMESTIC AUDIENCES AND COMPLIANCE WITH

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Assoc. (Aug. 29Sept. 1 2002),
4-5 (unpublished), available at https://web.stanford.edu/-tomz/working/apsa02.pdf.
OF
COMMERCE,
CHAMBER
of International Trade, U.S.
Benefits
59. The
(last
https://www.uschamber.com/international/intemational-policy/benefits-international-trade-0
visited Nov. 16, 2016).
60. Moran & Oldenski, supranote 21.
61. See generally Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
62. See generally TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE supra note 36.
63. See, e.g., WU, supranote 36; TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE supra note 36.
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them to place their own interpretations on the potential effects of a trade
agreement. 4 Thus, what the voters hear may be an extremely partisan assessment
of a trade agreement, perhaps distorted in certain respects.
The United States has long reflected a protectionist stance towards the auto
industry.6 5 The United States' auto industry is a powerful political force in the
country for a number of reasons. The auto industry employs a great number of
people and makes a significant contribution to the economy,6 the auto unions have
been active in politics,6 7 and the car produced by a Detroit carmaker has an iconic
place in the culture of the country.68 However, there is a risk in listening too
closely to those pressing protectionism in light of the participation of the auto
industry in the global value chain.69
C.

The InstitutionalDimension

The third dimension is institutional. The institutional dimension has to do
with the ability of institutions to interpret and apply the provisions of the trade
agreement. 0 Customs authorities may have almost as much difficulty in
interpreting the rules of origin as the businesses wishing to utilize the rules because
customs and business are on a par in receiving sparse legislative guidance. 71 Given
that, the customs authorities may often have to make country of origin
determinations on a case-by-case basis. This interpretation may or may not
coincide with the nation's trade policies or objectives, as political motivations for
trade may vary over time. The businesses affected may claim the country of origin
determinations are subjective and conflict with other determinations, thus offering
scant guidance or predictability. Product processing and assembly methods may
differ from country to country and that may lead customs authorities to assume that
a product was produced by the methods employed by the domestic industry rather
than the methods under which the product was in reality produced.7 2

64. Open argument: The case for free trade is overwhelming. But the losers need more help,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21695879-case-free-trade-

overwhelming-losers-need-more-help-openargument?cidl=cust/ednew/n/bl/n/20160331n/owned/n/n/nwl/n/n/AP/n;
Trade, at what price?:
America 's economy benefits hugely from trade. But its costs have been amplified by policy failures,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21695855-americas-

economy-benefits-hugely-trade-its-costs-have-been-amplified-policy;

Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, The

Questionable Rationale behind Washington's Antitrade Rhetoric, PETERSON
ECONOMICS

INST. FOR INT'L

65. Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5349 (1995).
66.

SCOTT, supranote 28.

67.

The Political Economy of American Trade Policy 163-66 (Anne 0. Krueger, ed., 1996),

http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8705.pdf.
68. Klier, supranote 10, at 2.

69. See Whalley, supra note 44, at 71.
70. ANNE VAN DE HEETKAMP & RUUD TUSVELD, ORIGIN MANAGEMENT: RULES OF ORIGIN IN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS v-vi (2011).

71. Id. at 122-24.
72.

118.

Importing authorities may visit an exporter's factory to ascertain the production method. Id. at
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Tariffs can be a barrier to international trade. 73 One of the reasons that a TPP
party enters into the trade agreement is the hope that a manufacturer in the country
may be able to take advantage of a lower tariff on the manufacturer's product that
is imported into the country of another TPP member. 74 In other words, trade among
the TPP partners is liberalized by lowering tariffs.75 The regional and global supply
chains are the backbone of today's auto industry.7 6 East Asia is notable in its
development of regional supply chains, a number of which are important to the
auto industry.
An auto is an extremely complex machine often comprised of components
sourced from around the world and firms within the auto industry are located
internationally.7 8 The international auto industry involves both market-seeking
investment and efficiency-seeking investment. 79 Promotion of efficiency-seeking
investment is one of the motivations for entering into a mega-regional trade
agreement.80 The auto, once assembled, is heavy and delicate.8 1 For that reason,
assembly plants are typically located in proximity to large markets with purchasing
power.82 Auto components are lighter and more easily transported than the cars
they comprise.8 3 Auto components suppliers have to keep in mind sequencing of
auto production and be located where they can smoothly fit into the sequence. At
the same time, lower cost inputs may contribute to profitability. Many suppliers
located where they can be more efficient by taking advantage of lower labor and
manufacturing costs.

84

International sourcing of auto components necessarily means cross-border
trade.8 5 The risks associated with trade time delay are often more crucial than trade
costs. 86 Trade patterns may influence countries entering into international trade

73.

John Manzella,

The Impact of Trade Barriers, THE MANZELLA REPORT (Jul.

http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/trade-finance/378-the-impact-of-trade-barriers
Jan. 21, 2016).
74.

1, 2016)

(last visited

1NT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3.

75. Id.
76. Timothy Sturgeon et al., Value Chains, Networks and Clusters: Reframing the Global
Automotive Industry, 8 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 297, 302-04 (2008).
77. Id. at 303.
78. Id. at 302-03.
79. An investor's motivation may be characterized as "market-seeking" where the geographical
location has a sales potential. The "efficiency-seeking" investment is motivated by being able to take
advantage of lower costs in a particular geographical location. Cecile Fruman, Why Does EfficiencySeeking FDI Matter?, WORLD BANK:
PRIVATE SECTOR DEv.
(Feb.
5, 2016),
http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/why-does-efficiency-seeking-fdi-matter.
80. Sturgeon et al., supra note 76.
81. Id. at 303-04.
82. Id. at 302-03.
83. Id. at 304.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 299, 304, 311; Thomas H. Klier, Determinants of Supplier Plant Location: Evidence
2
(3Q/2005),
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agreements to safeguard existing supply chains. With lean manufacturing,8 7
certainty of receiving auto components in a timely fashion is extremely important
to an auto manufacturer's profitability.88 In addition, international trade agreements
may cause the auto manufacturer to organize its supply chain across the countries
of the trade agreement. Price elasticity means that a small change in price can have
a big effect on demand and may influence a shift in the composition of the supply
chain.
A trade agreement may influence an auto manufacturer to shift part of its
supply chain from countries outside the trade agreement to countries that are
parties to the trade agreement. 90 A trade agreement can be viewed as a bargaining
device that gives smaller economies the potential of greater participation in global
value chains. Thus, a trade agreement may directly effect a movement in
production and investment. 9' Factors important to the auto industry include
predictability and certainty of market access to countries in which a portion of the
value chain is located. 9 2 Rules of origin for autos and auto components is an
important factor in an auto manufacturer developing supply chains as it permits
export and import of autos and auto components at low or zero tariff. 9
Utilization of a rule of origin is a multi-step process that tends to be
inefficient. 94 A high percentage of preferences go unused because either business
people are unaware that they could benefit or the costs of compliance are too high
in comparison with the potential savings.95 The first step is determining whether a
product qualifies under a trade agreement by assigning a country of origin. 96 The
next step is sustaining the importer's claim that the product meets the rule of
origin.9 7 This step involves the supplier to the manufacturing exporter, the
manufacturing exporter, the importer, and the exporting and importing
authorities.98 There is usually involvement of customs brokers, vendors of trade
documentation software, industry associations, and attorneys. 99 The potential final
step is the one in which an importing authority may perform an audit of the claim
87. Japan pioneered the lean manufacturing production system. The basic elements of this system
are "production quality, speedy response to market conditions, low levels of inventory, and frequent
deliveries of parts." Klier, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. McKINSEY & COMPANY, THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIER
INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION OF COMPONENT COSTS, PENETRATION, AND VALUE CREATION POTENTIAL
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that a particular product meets the applicable rule of origin. ' The company's
documentation trail must be sufficient to withstand the audit. 01
The company may feel the consequence of failing an audit, including delay
and added scrutiny of its imports. The most minor consequence is being forced to
pay the difference between the disallowed preferential tariff and the nonpreferential tariff.' 02 Civil penalties may be assessed by customs for noncompliance' 0 3 and may be retroactive, possibly covering a number of years of noncompliance.'0 For a large automobile company, the penalty can be millions of
dollars.
II.

05

THE AUTO INDUSTRY

Currently, multi-national carmakers world-wide compete in the automotive
market. The auto and auto parts industries are integrating themselves into a global
value chain and are some of the industries with the most participation in
international production. 1'0 What has become an international production network
began in the early years with a carmaker, perhaps with a headquarters located in a
"home country," positioning a fragment of the production process in a country
with low labor costs or close proximity and ability to complete certain auto
parts.107 For example, a close relationship between the Detroit, Michigan and
Ontario, Canada car industries was a natural development given the much shorter
distance between southeastern Michigan and Canada than between Detroit and
08
southern states engaged in the car industry, such as Kentucky and Tennessee.
The finished component was shipped back to the home country for further
incorporation into the auto or auto component.1 09 Gradually, the cross-border flow

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 114.

104.
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Id at 124.
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1582: The Year in Review, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 243, 244-46 (2008) (assessing Ford
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http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/DRINKERBIDDLEGARDNERCARTON,
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106. Leticia BlAzquez & Beldn Gonzhlez-Diaz, International Automotive Production Networks:
HtWeb Comes Together, 11 J. ECON. INTERACTION COORDINATION 119, 120 (2016).
107. Debdeep De, Regional Trade and International Production Networks: The Context of
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increased until the production process for the finished vehicle entailed multiple
border crossing." 0 Another gradual change was that the auto components produced
abroad became more sophisticated."'
The global value chain seems to have benefits for all concerned. Countries
with skilled but lower-cost labor benefit from increased employment prospects for
the country.1 1 2 Countries with higher labor costs, often where carmaker
headquarters are located, can outsource auto components to the lower-cost country,
can produce the finished vehicle at a lower cost and can realize higher profit." 3
Consumers benefit by being able to purchase the finished vehicle at a lower price
than possible were the production network limited to a single country. 114
A.

Modern History of the United States Auto Industry

During the first half of the twentieth century, United States automakers
dominated the United States auto industry. "5 From the mid-1950s to 2008, the
tables turned and the United States automakers lost more than forty percent of the
United States market." 6 In the middle of the twentieth century, foreign carmakers
began to introduce smaller cars into the United States.' 17 United States carmakers
could not compete in price because the cost for a United States carmaker of
producing a small car was not lower than that of producing a large car; this
similarity in production cost would have resulted in a smaller profit on the sale of a
small car versus a large car." 8 United States drivers could indulge their taste for
large cars for a while longer because of wider roads, longer driving distances, less
expensive gasoline, and more disposable income.1 9 Those drivers who preferred
smaller cars, such as the Volkswagen Beetle, could buy imports. In the 1970s,
small cars became much more popular because of the two oil crises that the nation
weathered.1 2 0 Congress mandated corporate average fuel economy standards in
1976, with fuel economy standards distorting the car market.'21 Foreign small cars
sold well because of their greater fuel efficiency, competitive pricing, and
perceived quality advantage.1 22 It took until the late 1970s for United States
carmakers to build smaller cars in the United States.' 23
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The United States auto industry wields considerable political power because
the auto industry is a major contributor to the United States economy. With the two
24
gas crises of the 1970s, Japan secured a foothold in the United States market.1
The substitution of imported cars for domestic cars was met with a political
backlash in the United States to rein in car imports.125 As a result of political
pressure and at the request of the United States, Japan implemented a voluntary
export restraint on Japanese cars imported into the United States in May of
1981 .126 Japan's voluntary export restraint did not lessen the demand from the
United States consumer for Japanese cars. To meet this demand, Japanese car
companies established assembly plants in the United States. 127 Within four years
after the voluntary export restraint, Honda had established itself in Marysville,
Ohio and Nissan had begun operations in Tennessee.128 Other Japanese carmakers,
129
including Toyota, Mazda, and Mitsubishi, followed suit.
Japanese carmakers producing cars in the United States had to find suppliers
of auto parts used in car manufacture.1 30 Traditionally, Japanese carmakers
developed long-term and cooperative relationships with their parts suppliers and
were loath to discontinue that relationship and switch to an alternative parts
supplier.'"' For that reason, Japanese carmakers with assembly plants located in the
United States did not immediately begin sourcing parts from United States
companies.1 32 Besides establishing assembly plants, Japanese carmakers began to
use foreign direct investment to develop parts suppliers within the United States. ''3
Japanese carmakers had developed 280 parts suppliers in the United States by
34
1993, with half solely owned by Japanese carmakers and half joint ventures.1
Until the 1990's, the United States auto industry was heavily vertically
integrated.1 35 The industry produced many auto parts in-house; parts manufacturers
in the United States and abroad produced parts not manufactured in-house.'3 The
United States automakers developed detailed specifications on parts and put parts
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out for bid, hoping to obtain the lowest possible price.' 37 The problems with this
procedure were multifold: the relationship between the part supplier and the
automaker was not a close and cooperative one; the bidding process often did not
result in parts known for their quality; and the bidding process did not encourage
much research and development or capital investment by the part supplier.' 3 8 For
those parts supplied from abroad, an automaker would purchase sufficient
quantities so that production was not impaired by a shipping delay.' 3 9
In the mid-1980s, the automakers began to source out more parts, rather than
produce them in house.1 4 0 That trend continued until, in the late 1990's, GM and
Ford spun off the parts divisions of their firms to create Delphi and Visteon.141
Because the two automakers had a global presence, the two new part supplier
companies also already had a global presence.1 42
B. The North American Auto Industry Today
A consumer restricting certain purchases to those products made in America
may do so because of a sense of patriotism, a desire to preserve jobs in the United
States, or a belief in the quality of the product. 143 Whether a car is "made in
America" is not as easy to discern as it once was when the car components were
produced and the car was assembled in the United States by a carmaker
headquartered in the United States.144 A United States auto consumer may obtain
some information on the origin of a new car being purchased by reviewing the
sticker that United States law requires be attached to the outside of the car.
Another indication of the origin of imported new cars and parts is the importer's
use of a rule of origin to obtain a lower preferential tariff.1 46 Rules of origin for
autos are introduced and reviewed in the following part of this article.
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North America hosts seventy assembly plants, with the plants concentrated in
a north-south swath, nicknamed "auto alley," primarily from Michigan through
Alabama.' 47 From the north end of auto alley, the auto production concentration
extends from Michigan into Ontario, Canada and there is a concentration of
production in central Mexico.1 48 Besides vehicle assembly plants, there are several
thousand plants worldwide that produce the approximately 15,000 parts that
49
become part of a vehicle.1
150 The
Investment in the auto industry is capital and skills intensive.
automotive industry is facing a number of pressures, including increasingly
stringent fuel standards, price increases on materials such as steel, rubber, and
plastic, increased labor costs, and the possibility of newly-mandated safety
features. 5 ' Price elasticity is the responsiveness of the amount of a product
demanded to the change in the price of the product. In other words, a small change
in price may make a large difference in demand for a product, with a lower price
5 2
Price
significantly increasing demand and a higher price decreasing demand.
a
product
for
components
elasticity often is a factor in a manufacturer sourcing
because the manufacturer is often seeking the least expensive cost for a
component, yet not at the sacrifice of quality.' 5 The auto industry has price
54
A
elasticity such that a change in car price can have an impact on sales.
lower-cost
a
new
finds
the
carmaker
carmaker has a potential bump in sales if
supplier and passes the cost saving along to the consumer. 1s Price elasticity may
56
lead to a manufacturer reshuffling its auto component suppliers.'
Lower labor costs, which are dependent on lower wages or benefits or less
rigid work rules, have influenced investment to shift towards the southern United
57
Auto
States, historically not an auto union stronghold, and towards Mexico.'
alley, together with its Canada extension, host approximately seventy-three percent
of North America's auto assembly and sixty-two percent of its parts supplier
plants.' 58 Mexico, the other area with a concentration of auto manufacturing, hosts
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nineteen percent of vehicle assembly plants and twenty percent of parts supplier
plants. 159
Because of the weight, size, and fragility of a finished vehicle as well as the
capital tied up in it, automakers tend to locate assembly plants close to end
markets.1 60 The location of auto alley facilitates a finished car reaching a dealer
showroom in a timely fashion. Within a one-day drive in the United States, a truck
can transport a finished vehicle from an assembly plant in auto alley as far as to
New York, in the far northeast extreme, or to Texas, in the far southwest
extreme.161
The auto parts industry is stratified into vertically arranged tiers.' 62 This
vertical structure places automakers at the top, first-tier suppliers below the
automakers, second-tier suppliers below first-tier suppliers, and third-tier suppliers
below second-tier suppliers.' 63 First-tier part suppliers supply the automakers,
second-tier parts suppliers supply first-tier parts suppliers, and third-tier parts
suppliers supply second-tier parts suppliers.1 64 The parts industry is extremely
dynamic and constantly subject to quick change because of competition among the
parts suppliers and the innovation knowledge that diffuses among the automaker
and parts suppliers.' 65
First-tier part suppliers produce specialized units.'1 Specialized units include
transmissions, engines, cockpit assemblies, and rolling chassis, which are also
heavy and bulky.' 67 To cut transportation costs and ensure timely delivery,
suppliers of specialized parts typically are clustered near auto assembly plants.1 68
As high as three-quarters of the specialized parts suppliers are located within a
one-day drive of an auto assembly plant.' 6 9 Some specialized parts suppliers,
including those who contribute seats, stamping, and trim, are located within an
hour drive.170
Second-tier and third-tier part suppliers produce sub-units and parts.' 7 ' More
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160. Id. at 105.
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72
generic parts, such as tires, batteries, and harnesses, are lighter.' A supplier of
this type of part can provide product to multiple automakers because a single
73
standardized part may function in vehicles of a number of different automakers.1
Suppliers of those more standardized parts can be located at more distant locations
74
to take advantage of lower labor costs and economies of scale.'

The relationship between the automakers and first tier suppliers, on one hand,
and down-stream suppliers of more standardized parts, on the other hand, is
distinct. Automakers have an ongoing relationship with their first-tier suppliers
that produce specialized parts and have to coordinate their activities closely with
the automakers.' 7 5 Specialized parts suppliers may be larger firms with more of a
76
global presence in that they have subsidiaries located around the world.' Lowertier suppliers of more generic parts generally do not have as close a relationship
with the automakers; in addition, they may be smaller firms, and their presence
77
Because of these factors, lower-tier
may be more local or regional than global.
out for suppliers who can
switched
suppliers may be more vulnerable to being
cost.1
a
lower
at
parts
supply the generic
The Detroit Three carmakers continue to be important in politics, with
79
politicians paying much more attention to the automakers than to their suppliers.1
This bargaining power of the automakers means that they can force domestic parts
80
suppliers to compete against foreign parts suppliers.' A lower-tier parts supplier
is especially fearful of being switched out for a foreign parts supplier that can offer
the same quality parts at a lower price.
C. The Relationship of Canadaand Mexico to the United States Auto Industry
NAFTA has encouraged Canada and Mexico to play a significant role in the
82
Canada produced 12.6 percent of North
North American auto industry.1
(including light trucks) in the first three
manufacturing
American light vehicle
percent in 2007, and in the first three
seventeen
from
quarters of 2015, reduced
of North American light vehicle
19.5
percent
produced
quarters of 2015, Mexico
84
83
in that their participation in
similar
are
and
Mexico
Canada'
manufacturing.'
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the auto manufacturing process has been dependent on foreign firms locating
operations in Canada and Mexico.' 8 5
The United States and Canada have run an integrated auto production
operation since the 1960s.' 86 The operation was centered in the Great Lakes region
and included Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Ontario, and Wisconsin.'1 7 Auto
production coordination began in 1965 when the United States and Canada signed
the Automotive Products Trade Agreement, commonly referred to as the "Auto
Pact."'88 Since then, Canada has run a negative trade balance with the United
States on auto parts and a positive trade balance with the United States on finished
vehicle.1 89 Those trade balances are an indication that many auto parts were
imported into Canada from the United States, primarily and, from those imported
parts, Canada produced many cars of a limited number of models, a substantial
portion of which were exported to the United States.' 9 0
The health of the Canadian auto industry has been variable from 1990 to the
present. The 1990s was a good decade for the Canadian auto industry, with the
peak in 1999.'9' From 2000 to 2007, there was a decline in Canada in new vehicle
production, which hit bottom in 2009 with the economic crisis.192 Canadian new
vehicle production started to pick up after the crisis but then began to decline again
because of loss of production facilities to the United States and Mexico and the
loss of a Canadian vehicle assembly plant.' 9 3 The year 2008 was significant for the
Canadian auto industry because Canadian auto production fell back to the level of
1987 at fourteen percent of North American production.1 94 In that same year, the
percentage of Mexican auto production in North America, at twenty percent, first
exceeded that of Canada.' 95
Statisticians monitoring Canadian auto and auto parts industries keep close
watch on Canada's balance of trade with its trading partners. Since 2009, the
Canadian positive automotive balance of trade within North America has declined,
mostly due to Mexican autos and auto parts being imported into Canada.19 6
Canada's largest trading partners in autos and auto parts other than in North
America are the European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea.1 97 As far as both
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autos and auto parts are concerned, Canada runs a negative trade balance with each
of these four trading partners.198 Between 1998 and 2008, Canada's negative trade
balance in finished vehicles was impacted heavily by Japanese imports and later by
imported finished vehicles from the European Union and South Korea.' 99 Since
2004, Canada's negative trade balance in auto parts has been negatively impacted
by an increase in auto parts imports from Korea and a sharp increase in auto parts
imports from China. 2 00 Significantly, Canada's negative automotive trade balance
with countries outside of NAFTA was greater in 2013 and 2014 than Canada's
positive trade balance with the United States. 201
Early on, the Mexican auto industry was an import substitution industry.202 In
1962, Mexico adopted a protectionist auto policy that had a significant impact on
the country. 203 The 1962 policy:
1) banned imports of auto engines and certain other auto parts;
2) banned imports of completed autos;
3) mandated that sixty percent of the auto parts used in autos
manufactured in Mexico be of domestic origin; and
4) mandated that auto parts suppliers have at least sixty percent
Mexican ownership.204

The objective of the 1962 policy was to attract the auto industry to Mexico to
sell vehicles to the growing Mexican market. 205 By the mid-1960s, VW and Nissan
had established a presence in Aguascalientes and Puebla, both located in proximity
206
to Mexico City.

The Mexican auto industry saw further changes in the 1980's and 1990's. In
the 1980's, GM and Ford located plants in northern Mexico to produce autos
destined for the United States.2 07 NAFTA made a substantial change in the
208
With
Mexican auto industry because Mexico loosened its prior restrictions.
NAFTA, the twenty percent import duty that Mexico charged on light vehicles was
9
reduced to zero over ten years for Canadian and United States imports.20 The
minimum content of Mexican content for Mexican-produced cars was reduced
0
from between thirty-four and thirty-six percent to zero over ten years. 2' After
2004, 62.5% of the content had to be from a NAFTA country for duty-free export
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from Mexico to another NAFTA country. 211
Prior to NAFTA, the Mexican auto industry had begun to transition from an
import substitution industry to an export industry.2 1 2 Five automakers, Chrysler,
Ford, GM, Nissan, and VW, had already established a presence in Mexico. 2 13
Those five automakers had a head start when NAFTA took effect and encountered
lower barriers to taking advantages to the NAFTA provisions concerning autos. 2 14
Subsequently, Honda and Toyota established a production presence in Mexico.
Mazda and Audi have either established a presence in Mexico or announced plans
21
to do so.215 Lower labor cost encourages certain auto industry production in
216
Mexico.
For example, Mexico can still make a profit, albeit slim, on subcompact cars and compact cars, and is attractive to manufacture that is labor
217
intensive.
Mexico's auto industry is primarily an export market. 2 1 8 In 2012, Mexico
ranked fourth in the world in auto exports behind Germany, Japan, and South
Korea. 21 9 There are several factors in Mexico's favor.220 Lower labor costs make
Mexico an attractive location;221 fairly low shipping costs make exports of cars
from plants located in northern Mexico to the United States feasible; 222 location of
auto plants near the Pacific Ocean facilitates export of Mexican-manufactured cars
to Asia;223 and Mexico has signed free trade agreements with over forty countries,
including those with the European Union and Japan. 224
III.

RULES OF ORIGIN FOR AUTOS

Application of the TPP rules of origin determines the derivation country of a
product, such as an auto or an auto component, and the TPP rules of origin are
designed to confine the benefit of the reduced preferential tariff under TPP to those
autos and auto components manufactured and whose input is from the TPP
225
parties.
Under TPP, the tariff is generally reduced for autos and auto
components exported into one of the TPP countries so long as the exporter meets
the requirements of TPP rules of origin and the importer has the appropriate
supportive documentation. 226 The purpose of the rules of origin is to limit the

211. Id.
212. HOSHINO, supra note 122, at 5.

213.
214.
215.
216.

Klier & Rubenstein, supra note 108, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.

217.

HOLMES, supranote 186, at 4.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 3; Klier & Rubenstein, supra note 108, at 3.
Klier & Rubenstein, supra note 108, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

224.
225.

HOLMES, supranote 186, at 4; Klier & Rubenstein, supra note 108, at 3.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 225.

226. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

180

VOL. 45:2

benefits of a preferential trade agreement, like TPP, to the parties to the trade
agreement.
A. TariffReduction Schedules
Tariff reduction schedules are important in that they specify the time period
over which tariffs on autos and auto parts will be reduced and in what amounts.227
Neither tariff reduction schedules nor the present tariff rates are uniform among the
various TPP parties. 228 For the countries that already have a free trade agreement
with the United States, there would be a zero tariff on imports of United States cars
into those countries. 229 With certain countries, the tariff reductions extend over a
period of time and can be back loaded. For example, the tariff reduction period on
cars imported from Japan into the United States spans twenty five years and the
reduction begins in year fifteen.230 Brunei and New Zealand will reduce tariffs on
imports of United States cars over ten years, as will Malaysia and Vietnam for
certain tariff classifications.231 For Malaysia and Vietnam, the tariff on certain
tariff classifications will not be reduced until TPP has been in force for thirteen
232

years.
2 33
The tariff reduction schedule for some countries has received discussion.
234
which is
The tariff reduction schedule for chapter 87 of the harmonized system,
235
The lengthy and
the automotive chapter, is viewed in an overall positive light.
back-loaded nature of the tariff reduction schedule was welcomed by some
2 36
because of Japan's past unwillingness to open its auto industry to competition.
Some are disappointed that the full tariff reduction for Malaysia and Vietnam for
237
The
some of the most important tariff classifications extends over thirteen years.
United States automotive industry may see a decrease in exports to Canada when
Canada eliminates tariffs on Japanese cars in year six.238
239
and blatantly
Rules of origin are meant to rectify the "free-rider" problem

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 238-39, tbl.4.11.
Each TPP party's commitment to eliminate tariffs is specified on its Schedule to Annex 2-D.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 238.
Id. at 238-39, 239 tbl.4.11.
Id. at 238-39, 239 tbl.4.1 1.
Id. at 238-40, tbl.4.1 1, tbl.4.12.

233.

INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTO. EQUIP. & CAPITAL GOODS, THE TRANS-PACIFIC

PARTNERSHIP TRADE AGREEMENT 5 (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ITAC-2-AutomobileEquipment-and-Capital-Goods.pdf [hereinafter INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM.).
234. Trans-Pacific Partnership Annex 3-D, at 15765.
235.

INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 233, at 5.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 232.

239. One reason for a country to become a party to TPP is to have autos and auto components
produced in the TPP-member country benefit from preferential tariff rates. An auto component supplier
located in a non-TPP country might still indirectly benefit, in other words become a free-rider, if the
component was incorporated into an auto that received a preferential tariff. See Chris Brummer,
Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A Trade Perspective, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 535, 536,
548-49 (2008).
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discriminate against other, non-TPP, countries benefitting from the lower tariffs
under TPP.240 For example, without the rules of origin, a non-TPP country could
try to free-ride on the lower TPP tariff and circumvent TPP by shipping a product
to a TPP country and, from there, shipping the same product to another TPP
country. For that reason, the rules of origin are extremely politically protectionist
and are reflective of the nationalist tendencies of the parties to the trade
agreement. 24 1
One might take Australia as an example. Australia receives a significant
volume of imported finished cars and complex parts from the United States and
Japan.2 4 2 To take advantage of the reduced preferential tariff offered by Australia
under TPP, the United States and Japan will have to be cognizant of and meet the
limits on non-originating components under TPP for those cars and car
components imported into Australia.2 4 3
B. Club Goods
In considering the rules of origin for autos under TPP, benefits of a regional
trade agreement could be considered club goods. 2 44 The idea of club goods is an
economic theory245 that views the members of the trade agreement like members of
a private club. Part of the attraction of the private club is that it is exclusive in that
members are admitted to the club based on certain preconditions and non-members
are discriminated against in not receiving the advantages available to club
members.2 46 Joining the club is enticing with the prospect of participating in new
opportunities. There is also fear of being excluded from the popular group if one
does not join.2 47
Central to the TPP are reciprocal trade concessions from the twelve TPP
parties in which each party lowers certain tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade in
exchange for concessions from other parties so as to open market access among the
parties. 2 4 8 The hope is that all parties will benefit, but the benefit varies from party
to party and from sector to sector. There are several club goods effects of TPP.
One club goods effect is that TPP parties obtain access to new markets at a lower
tariff rate than previously. 249 For example, Malaysia and Vietnam presently have
tariffs on auto components that can reach the high of seventy percent. 25 0 To tariff
"jump" or "hop" the high tariff, some multi-national companies in the automotive
240. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 238-39.
241. INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM., supranote 233, at 3-4, 6-7.
242. WU, supra note 36, at 1. In the past, Australia was an auto manufacturer. However, Ford,
Holden, and Toyota will be ceasing auto manufacturing in Australia. ECONOMICS REFERENCES
COMMITTEE, FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA'S AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: INTERIM REPORT 57 (2015).

243. Wu, supranote 36, at 2-3.
244. Brummer, supranote 239, at 536-37.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id. at 540-41.
Id.
Whalley, supranote 44, at 69-70.
ARENT Fox LLP, supra note 151.
Id.
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industry located production in those countries. 2 51 With a lower tariff under TPP,
those companies that are in the mode of consolidating their interests may rethink
whether they want to keep production there. 252 Another club goods effect is that
TPP parties can use cheaper auto parts from some TPP countries in the auto
manufacturing process.253 For example, a number of Japanese part suppliers rely
254
on cheaper inputs from Malaysia and Vietnam.
Sometimes the club members are unsuccessful in keeping club goods to
themselves and non-club members reap an indirect benefit when the benefits of the
club spillover to the benefit of non-members. A spillover effect in the auto industry
is where automakers or auto parts suppliers are able to incorporate parts from nonTPP countries, yet still comply with the rules of origin. 255 A firm would do this if
56
use of parts from non-TPP countries result in a cost savings for the firm.2
Whether a spillover effect is advantageous or not is dependent on a firm's
geographical location and the tier at which the firm is situated in the auto
industry.

257

C. Regulatory Opportunism
A country that is not a member of a trade agreement may attempt to take
advantage of club goods that spillover from the closed circle of parties to the trade
agreement. The action of a non-member taking what members of the trade
agreement likely view as an unfair advantage may be seen as opportunistic because
the trade agreement was established to restrict the benefit of club goods to the
member of the club.2 58 Parties to the trade agreement may view outsiders as
untrustworthy and trade agreement parties may fear that outsiders are acting out of
ulterior motives. 259 One of the goals of the regulations within a trade agreement is
to reduce opportunistic behavior. 260 The spillover effect may mean that a non-TPP
member is engaging in regulatory opportunism. However, regulatory restrictions,
such as rules of origin, are not fool-proof and regulatory opportunism may be a
product. The distrust held by TPP members may raise a perception that a nonmember is thus gaining an advantage that was not negotiated by the nonmember.

26 1

The countries most worrisome at this point in receiving spillover benefits
from TPP appear to be China and Thailand, but other countries in Asia could be of
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Wu, supra note 36, at 2-3.
258. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model 2 (Nat'I
Bureau of Econ. Research No. 18227, 2012).
259. Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18257; Id.
260. Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Economic Integration and Governance: The
Role of PreferentialTrade Agreements, 5 J. INT'L EcON. INTEGRATION No. 2, 1, 1 (1990).
261. Acemoglu & Wolitzky, supra note 258, at 1.
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concern in the future. China and Thailand are worrisome because they can produce
auto parts at a cost savings over other countries. 262 An example of the potential
spillover effect of the rules of origin is that Japan could use parts from non-TPP
countries, such as China and Thailand, in its manufacture of autos and auto parts,
yet still comply with the TPP rules of origin. Currently, China supplies the most
auto body parts, airbags, and miscellaneous auto parts to Japan as well as
supplying the most brakes and wheels to Japan and the United States. 263
Of course, use of Chinese and Thai parts is not limited to Japan and the
United States is not the only country concerned whether the lower mandated
percentages under the TPP rules of origin will result in a spillover effect. 2 64
Canadian auto parts producers located in Ontario, Canada that currently sell to the
Canadian or United States auto industries may be replaced by suppliers of lowercost imports from China and Thailand.265 On the other hand, Canadian automakers
could benefit by switching from higher cost Canadian parts to lower-cost Chinese
and Thai parts.2 6
D. SubstantialTransformation
Historically, the concept of "substantial transformation" 267 was the key in the
United States for determining whether a product originally from a foreign
jurisdiction has undergone a process domestically such that it could be considered
as originating domestically. 268 An understanding of the term helps one understand
some of the methods commonly used in various rule of origin schemes, including
TPP.269 When considering application of a preferential tariff under a preferential
trade agreement, one step in the process is to distinguish between an originating
and non-originating product by examining if the manufacturing process has
substantially transformed the non-originating input to the product. 270
The genesis of the transformation concept was dependent on two United
States Supreme Court cases. The first case, Hartranftv. Wiegmann,271 was decided
in 1887 and the second case, Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United
States, 272 was decided in 1908. In Hartranft, the issue was whether a

262.

TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE, supra note 36, at 18.

263. Matthew Schewel, TPP Auto ROO Most Likely To Hurt Makers Of Less Complex Parts:
Experts (2016), INSIDE TRADE, http://insidetrade.com/share/152178 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
264. Noakes, supra note 183.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. The test to determine whether substantial transformation has taken place "is whether the good
has emerged from a given process with a 'distinctive name, character or use' in a particular state."
Joseph A. LaNasa III, Rules of Origin under the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Substantial
Transformation into Objectively Transparent Protectionism, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. No. 2, 381, 384
(1993) (quoting Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. UnitedStates, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908)).
268. Id. at 384-85.
269. VAN DE HEETKAMP & TUSVELD, supra note 70, at 74-75.
270. Id.
271. Hartranftv. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 609-611 (1887).
272. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. US., 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908).
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manufacturing operation had been performed on a product such that customs
273
The Court formulated the
authorities would impose a higher duty on the product.
idea that the product must be changed in character for customs to conclude that the
product had been manufactured.274 In this case, the Philadelphia customs district
had charged J. H. Wiegmann & Son a thirty-five percent ad valorem duty when the
firm imported shells into the United States from London on the basis that they fell
275
The firm's position was that no duty
into the category of manufactured shells.
276
The firm stated: "These
was owed because the shells were not manufactured.
shells have [simply] had the outer layer ground off so as to exhibit the beautiful
inner layer. That has been done by the application of a wheel, and afterwards by
polishing."2 7 7 The United States Supreme Court sided with Wiegmann, the
importer, and found that the shells did not fall into the category of manufactured
shells. 278 The Court stated: "They were still shells. They had not been
manufactured into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character,
279
or use from that of a shell."
The United States Supreme Court relied on the reasoning of Hartranfit when
the Court used the word "transformation" in 1908 in Anheuser-Busch Brewing
Association v. United States.2 80 In that case, Anheuser-Busch had paid a duty when
28
it imported cork from Spain to use in bottling beer. 1 The beer bottled using the
corks originating from Spain was later exported and the case arose after the beer
was exported.2 8 2 The brewer wanted to use a "drawback" provision of customs
regulation that would have permitted the brewer to obtain a refund of the customs
28 3
The brewer's
duty paid when the cork was originally imported from Spain.
perfonned a
had
brewer
the
because
due
was
the
refund
that
argument was
process
bottling
in
the
it
for
use
prepare
cork
to
on
the
operation
manufacturing
and the cork was subsequently re-exported.2 84 For the time period, the potential
refund was the quite sizable amount of $10,995 USD paid on 73,299.78 pounds of
imported cork.285 The Court disagreed with the brewer and found that the brewer
was not due the refund because the cork had not undergone a manufacturing
operation as required under the customs regulation: "There must be transformation;
a new and different article must emerge, 'having a distinctive name, character, or
2 86
use.' This cannot be said of the corks in question."

273.
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277.
278.
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282.
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284.
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286.

See Hartranfit,121 U.S. at 613-14.
Id. at 615.
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See Hartranft, 121 U.S. at 615.
Anheuser-Busch, 207 U.S. at 562.
Id. at 559, finding 3.
Id at 558.
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The substantial transformation rule has not necessarily been applied over the
years in a consistent, predictable, or coherent fashion, perhaps because of the
subjectivity necessarily inherent in the test. 287 One reason for including detailed
rules of origin in a preferential trade agreement is to make determination of
whether a product is originating or non-originating more consistent and to avoid
problems encountered in administering the rules of origin in prior trade
agreements. 2 88 Although detailed rules of origin may lead to more consistent
application, the rules of origin in recent preferential trade agreements have become
so complicated that their utilization may require teams of attorneys and
professionals trained in customs matters to interpret them. 289 Some of the
complication may come from the fact that individual provisions of the rules of
origin are the result of lobbying by some industry of a particular country to draw
intricate lines carving out benefits for itself There are some common principles
running through the rules of origin in the various preferential trade agreements; 290
however, there is not a match between the differing rules of origin schemes of the
many trade agreements.
E.

Basic Principleson Rules of Originfor Autos

Prior to delving into the complicated specifics of the TPP rules of origin, it
might be helpful to provide some principles common to rules of origin. Rules of
origin are designed to handle multi-country transactions in which various
components of a manufactured item and its assembly take place in different
locations around the globe. 291 A preferential trade agreement, like TPP,
distinguishes between "originating" goods, which come from a country within the
preferential trade agreement, and "non-originating" goods, which come from a
country outside the preferential trade agreement. 292 Even if material or a part is
non-originating because it was imported into a TPP country from a non-TPP
country, it could be deemed originating if it were substantially transformed in a
country within the preferential trade agreement.293
Rules of origin for autos are extremely complicated and the complication is
meant to draw fine lines to distinguish between originating and non-originating
goods so that TPP countries achieve the bargained-for protection for sensitive
industries. 294 Complying with the rules of origin is a huge expense for a company
and the company may have a whole staff to deal with the documentation from the
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DONALDSON
COMPANY,
INC.,
RULES
OF
ORIGIN,
https://www.donaldson.com/en/supplier/compliance/origin.pdf.
288. William J. Kovatch, Jr., The NAFTA's Rules of Origin, Certificate of Origin, and Recordkeeping Requirements: The Disadvantageto Small Businesses, 12 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 403, 409 (1999).
289. Id. at 417-19.
290.
291.

VAN DE HEETKAMP & TUSVELD, supra note 70, at 98-104.
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295
TPP Articles 3.20 through 3.26 concern the certificate of
product components.
296
Article 3.27 concerns verification of the certificate of origin
origin requirements,
297
Articles 3.28 through 3.29
by the country into which the good is imported,
2 98
Article 3.30 concerns penalties, 299 and Article 3.31 concerns
concern claims,
confidentiality.30 0 The advantage of using the rules of origin can be sizable for a
big company such as an automaker. 3 01 A big company cumulating a very low drop
in cost for each of a high number of products can still find using the rules of origin
profitable because the cost saving in tariff exceeds the cost spent in utilizing the
rules of origin.302 For a big car company, the company can make good use of the
rules of origin for cost saving.
Some producers fail to use rules of origin even though their use would
303
As more fully
decrease the amount of tariff paid to have a product clear customs.
can be
agreement
of
a
trade
origin
rules
of
described below, implementing the
3
rules
of
utilization
The
quite complicated and require keeping detailed records.
higher
being
of
origin
the
rules
with
of origin is based on gains from complying
than the total of: a) costs of complying with the rules of origin; and b) the
305
reduction in tariffs.
Three principles provide the foundation for the multi-country rules of origin.
The three principles are:

1) tariff shift;
2) value percentage criteria; and
3) specified process.

306

These three principles are tools used to determine whether substantial
transformation has occurred.307
A good within a particular tariff classification may shift to fall into a different
tariff classification after undergoing processing or manufacture. The tariff shift
principle permits a good originating outside any TPP country to be considered
originating in a TPP country if the non-originating good was substantially
transformed in the TPP country. 308 The value percentage criteria is based on a

295. Kovatch, supra note 288, at 417-19.
296. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, arts. 3.20-3.27, Nov. 12,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Rules-of-Origin-and-Origin-Procedures.pdf
297. Id. ch. 3, art. 3.27.
298. Id ch. 3, arts. 3.28-3.29.
299. Id ch. 3, art. 3.30.
300. Id. ch. 3, art. 3.31.
301. Kovatch, supra note 288, at 419.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 417-18.
305. Id. at 417-19.
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306. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 236-37.
307. David Palmeter, THE WTO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
AND POLICY, 154-55 (2003).
308. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 226.
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comparison between the domestic and foreign content of a good. 3 0 It requires that
the imported good either contain a minimum percentage of originating content or
that the imported good not exceed a maximum non-originating content. 310 The
specified process principle permits a good that was originally non-originating to be
considered originating if the non-originating good underwent a process in a TPP
country that substantially transformed it.311
Although use of one of the three principles would seem to provide clarity not
inherent in the determination of whether a substantial transformation has occurred,
none of the three principles is entirely foolproof in producing coherent results.3 12 In
addition, a particular rule of origin for a particular industry may combine the use of
two or more of the three principles described in this section.3 13
The use of a tariff shift is dependent on the intersection between the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, often referred to as the
Harmonized System, and the rules of origin of a particular trade agreement. 314 The
elaborate nature of the Harmonized System, more fully described in the following
section, might make one think that use of tariff shift provisions leads to consistent
and predictable results. 31 5 The purpose of the Harmonized System was to be able to
classify a wide range of imported products and generate import statistics; however,
the purpose of the Harmonized System was not to enable determination of when a
preferential tariff should be applied. 1 One problem is that different customs
authorities may classify different goods differently and thus assign different tariff
codes to the same good. 1 The tariff codes may not be sufficiently detailed for
some products in that substantial processing of a particular product may not result
in a tariff shift. This happens when a processed product continues to be classified
under the same tariff code as the inputs for the product.
There is another problem with the tariff shift principle. The rules of origin in a
trade agreement are typically negotiated with the purpose of protecting certain
sensitive industries.3 18 To do so may considerably lengthen the rules of origin
because the negotiators must include tariff shift schedules comprised of tables of
various tariff codes, often with reference to detailed exceptions.3 9 Deciphering the
effect of tariff shift schedules requires knowledge of the Harmonized System and
some experience working with it.
The value percentage criteria is not without its problems. Determining value
percentage requires an intensive accounting exercise, yet accounting methods are
309. David Palmeter, supra note 307.
310. Id. at 236-37.
311. Id.
312.

VAN DE HEETKAMP & TUSVELD, supra note 70, at 122-24.
See, e.g., INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 236-37.

313.
314.
315.
316.

LaNasa, supra note 267, at 388.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.

317.

VAN DE HEETKAMP & TUSVELD, supranote 70, at 122-24.

318. Wu, supra note 36, at 2, 3.
319. Whitten, supranote 36.
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0
not consistent throughout the world. 32 The elaborate accounting exercise must be

backed up with documents to protect the importer should the customs
administration decide to audit the cost of materials and production on which the
customs declaration was based. 321 The results of the calculation are not necessarily
consistent, given that the currency exchange rates and prices of inputs likely vary
over time and labor and other production costs vary from country to country.322
The specified process principle seems to be more straightforward at first
glance. It is designed to distinguish a process that substantially transforms a good
from a process that is minimal or that can be done easily with minimal equipment,
such as a screwdriver. 323 One drawback is that the principle lengthens the rules of
origin because the covered processes must be stated in sufficient detail so that
there can be an understanding of what a particular process means.324 There still
may be a disagreement between the customs authorities and the firm claiming the
preferential treatment as to whether the operation performed falls within a
particular process category specified in the rule of origin. 325 Another drawback is
that future technology may not be adequately covered in the rules of origin because
the technology was non-existent when the trade agreement was negotiated.
F.

The HarmonizedSystem Description and Coding System

The tariff shift principle requires an understanding of tariff schedules. The
327
which
World Customs Organization 32 6 developed the Harmonized System,
classifies roughly 5,000 commodity groups and identifies each group by a six-digit
code. 328 More than 200 countries use the system for its original purpose of tracking
trade passing across international boundaries; 32 9 however, the system was not
originally developed as a tool for duty classification nor determination of country
of origin. 330 TPP requires use of the Harmonized System to determine rules of
origin and tariffs imposed on an auto or auto component imported into a TPP
country when the importer relies on a tariff shift provision of TPP. 331
The Harmonized System is comprised of six-digit codes. 332 The first two
digits are referred to as the chapter, the first four digits are referred to as the
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ACCOUNTING METHODS & STANDARDS & BONUS DEPRECIATION: SELECTED ANALYSES (Suzanne
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321.
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heading, and the entire six digits are referred to as the subheading.333 Countries
that want more detail are at liberty to add additional digits, but any digits above six
are country-specific.334
Certain portions of the Harmonized System are critical to the auto industry.33 5
Subheadings 8407.33 and 8407.34 corresponds to vehicle engines; 336 subheading
8544.30 corresponds to wire harnesses.337 Heading 8703 corresponds to passenger
vehicles.3 3 8 A number of subheadings within heading 8708 are important to the
automotive industry; these include 8708.29 (vehicle body parts);33 9 8708.30
(brakes and parts); 340 8708.40 (transmissions); 341 8708.70 (road wheels and
8708.99
parts); 342 8708.94 (steering wheels); 34 3 airbags (8708.95);"
(miscellaneous motor vehicle parts). 345 An example of product-specific rules of
origin that is provided later in this Part references some of these tariff lines.
G. Basic TPP Provisions ImpactingRules on Origin
Rules of origin are obscure and technical in nature. Determining if an auto or
auto component meets the TPP rules of origin is an exercise of patience. Under
TPP, 346 one must consider: 1) Chapter 3; 2) Annex 3-D (to Chapter 3); and 3)
Appendix 1 (to Annex 3-D). 347
Chapter 3 of TPP encompasses rules of origin basic provisions. 348 Section A
of Chapter 3 (Articles 3.1 through 3.18) comprises substantive provisions; 349 and
Section B of Chapter 3 (Articles 3.19 through 3.32) comprises procedures. 350
Annex 3-D to Chapter 3, which is 212 pages in length, contains the productspecific rules of origin. 351 The product-specific rules of origin of Annex 3-D are
based on the principles of tariff shift and regional value content. 352 An example of
portions of this Annex is included later in this part.3 53 Appendix 1 to Annex 3-D
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343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id.
Id.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D, at 96-97, 154, 157-65.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 96-97, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 2-3.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D, at 154.
Id. at Annex 3-D, at 157.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 158, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 2.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 159, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 3.
Id.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D, at 159.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 160, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 3.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 161, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 3.
Id.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, https://ustr.gov/tpp/.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, Annex 3-D, Annex 3-D app. 1.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3 Exec. Summary.
Id. at 3.1-3.18.
Id. at 3.19-3.31.
Id Annex 3-D.

352.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 226.

353.

Infra note 392 and accompanying text.
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has provisions that directly relate to autos and auto parts.354 Appendix 1 is only
three pages long, but it contains three tables, designated as tables A, B, and C. 355
356
Table B is based on specific processes, the third principle of rules of origin.
Autos and auto components meet the TPP rules of origin if they fall into one
of three categories (TPP Article 3.2) and otherwise comply with chapter 3.5 TPP
Article 3.6 permits a material originating from a non-TPP country to be considered
originating when it undergoes a substantial transformation. 3"s TPP Article 3.10, the
accumulation provision, permits an originating product from any TPP country to
count toward the threshold. 3
When reviewing the three categories of TPP Article 3.2, the first and the
3 60
In
second categories seem to be the easiest to understand and comply with.
simple terms, the first category is comprised of raw materials, including minerals,
mined from a TPP party; the second category is comprised of products
manufactured within a TPP party from materials originating within a TPP party,
but the materials may contain materials sourced from a non-TPP country. 3 For
example, a TPP country could import pig iron that the country processes into cast
iron, which is used to make the auto engine. 362 The cast iron portion of the auto
363
For the finished auto engine to fall within the
engine would be originating.
second category, every other part in the engine besides that cast iron portion must
be originating.3 6 The third category is satisfied if the product meets the productspecific rules of origin.365 Because of the multi-country nature and complexity of
the manufacturing involved in the automobile industry, chances are that producers
in the industry will have little occasion to use either of the first two categories of
the rules of origin with the exception, perhaps, of second-tier or third-tier suppliers
of very basic auto components.366
The third category of rules of origin will be crucial to the automotive industry
in claiming preferential tariff treatment and is the category most often used by the
auto industry.36 7 The two basic divisions within the third category are tariff shift,
meaning that the tariff classification for a good has changed, and regional value
content. 368 To use regional value content, a producer must have at least a minimum

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D app. 1.
Id. at 1-3.
Id at 2.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.2.
Id. art. 3.6.
Id. art. 3.10.
Id. art. 3.2(a), (b).

361.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 225-26.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 236.
Id.
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regional value content by performing a quantitative analysis. 369 This means that at
least a certain portion of the product must come from TPP countries (TPP
originating materials) and limits the amount of materials coming from countries
outside TPP (non-originating materials). 370
The quantitative analysis required to determine regional value content is an
accounting exercise. In this exercise, elements such as the value of goods used in
production, labor, overheads, and other costs are examined to determine if they
meet a particular threshold percentage. 371 TPP regional value content comprises
four separate methods, any one of which may be used in calculating a product's
regional value content as long as it is one of the methods specified for a good of a
particular tariff classification.372 TPP article 3.5 contains the formulas for
calculating the focused value method, the build-down method, the build-up
method, and the net cost method.3 73
Someone who wants to use regional value content to qualify a product under
the TPP rules of origin would determine which method of the methods allowable
would be most beneficial.37 4 A further description of each of the four formulas is
useful here. The focused value method is a new method for calculating regional
value content beyond the methods included in NAFTA. 375 The method is
"focused" in that the calculation is based only on the value of the non-originating
materials specified in the product specific rules of Annex 3-D. 3 76 The build-down
method requires the regional value content to be calculated based on the value of
all non-originating materials.3 77 The build-down method is the one that Japan
reportedly prefers.378 One notices that both the focused value method and the
build-down method require a calculation of the value of non-originating
materials.3 7 9 This calculation may be simpler than other calculations if the customs
valuation of the imported materials is available; however, other costs associated
with the imported materials, such as transportation, might also figure into the
calculation. 38 0 The build-up method requires the regional value content to be
calculated based on the value of originating materials.3 8 The net cost method
compares the net cost of the good, less the value of non-originating materials, as

369. Id.
370. TPP art. 3.11 does permit a de minimis inclusion of non-originating goods if not more than
10%. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch.3, art. 3.11.
371. See U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Rules of Origin, A Regional Value Content Rule,

EXPORT.Gov, http://2016.export.gov/FTA/korea/eg main 048793.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2016)
[hereinafter U.S. -Korea Free Trade Agreement].

372.
373.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5.
Id.

374.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 236-37.

375. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5(a).
376. Id.
377. Id. art. 3.5(b).
378.

TPP RULE OF ORjGIN is 45%, supra note 37.

379.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5(a), (b).

380.
381.

See US.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, supra note 371.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5(c).
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compared to the net cost of the good.382
Appendix 1 to Annex 3-D adds another layer of complexity to the already
complicated rules of origin for autos.383 Appendix 1 is referenced in a footnote to
384
Appendix 1 contains
the table included in the following section of this part.
3
types
of safety glass, two
Tables A, B, and C. " Table A lists seven auto parts: two
386
Table B lists
types of vehicle bodies, bumpers, door assemblies, and drive-axles.
die or other
welding,
eleven processing operations: complex assembly, complex
casting, extrusion, forging, heat treatment, laminating, machining, metal forming,
388
The
molding, and stamping.38 Table C lists certain key auto components.
considered
material and parts used in producing those key components are
originating if they meet their own regional value content or are produced using at
389
However, if a processing method
least one of the processes listed on Table B.
from Table B is used in production, Table C specifies a maximum on the value of
the materials and parts that can be deemed originating content under the value
(build-up / build-down) or net cost methods of calculating regional value
content. 390 Some of the auto parts and the applicable percentages shown on Table
C include: engines (8407.33 and 8407.34)(10%); bumpers, brakes, and
transmissions (10%); airbags and other vehicle parts (8707.99)(5%).39'
H.

An Example ofProduct-Specific Rules of Origin

The third category of rules of origin encompasses more and is much more
detailed than one might initially anticipate. One way to gain some understanding of
the complexity of product-specific rules of origin is to review portions of TPP that
are closely connected to the auto and auto parts industries. A glance at selected
392
portions of TPP Annex 3-D shows the following information:

382. Id. art. 3.5(d).
INDUST. TRADE ADvISORY COMM., supra note 233, at 7.
384. Infra note 397 and accompanying text.
385. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D app. 1.
386. Id. at 2.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 2-3.
389. Id. at 1, 1.
390. Id at 1, IM 2-3.
391. See Whitten, supra note 36 (discussing the application of this appendix to the manufacture of
a car body from steel imported from China).
392. Trans-Pacific Partnership Annex 3-D, at 96-97, 154, 157-61.
383.
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Classification

Classified product

Product-Specific Rule of Origin

8407.33t393

Spark-ignition
reciprocating piston
engines of a kind used for
the propulsion of vehicles
of Chapter 87 : Of a
cylinder capacity
exceeding
250 cc but not exceeding
1,000 cc

No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8407.33 through 8407.34,
provided there is a regional value content of not

8407.34tN

less than:
(a) 45 per cent under the build-up method;
or
(b) 45 per cent under the net cost method; or
(c) 55 per cent under the build-down method.
h

eSpark-ignition See above

reciprocating piston
engines of a kind used for
the propulsion of vehicles

of Chapter 87 : Of a
cylinder capacity
exceeding 1,000 cc
8544.30

Wire harnesses

A change to a good of subheading 8544.30

from any other subheading, except from
heading 74.08, 74.13, 76.05, 76.14 or
subheading 8544.11 through 8544.20 or

8544.42 through 8544.60; or
No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8544.30, provided there is
a regional value content of not less than:
(a) 35 per cent under the build-up method;

or
(b) 45 per cent under the build-down
method; or
(c) 60 per cent under the focused value
method taking into account only the nonoriginating
materials of heading 74.08, 74.13,
76.05, 76.14 and subheading 8544.11 through
8544.60.
870.02-87.95t

Cars

No change in tariff classification required for a

good of heading 87.02 through 87.05, provided
there is a regional value content of not less

than:
(a) 45 per cent under the net cost method; or
(b) 55 per cent under the build-down method.

393. Id.
394. Id.
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Bodies for the motor
vehicles of heading 8703

VOL. 45:2

A change to a good of subheading 8708.10
through 8708.21 from any other subheading; or
No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8708.10 through 8708.21,
provided there is a regional value content of not
less than:
(a) 45 per cent under the build-up method;
or
(b) 45 per cent under the net cost method; or
(c) 55 per cent under the build-down method.

8708.70396

397

Road wheels and parts

A change to a good of subheading 8708.70
from any other subheading; or
No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8708.70, provided there is
a regional value content of not less than:
(a) 35 per cent under the build-up method;
or
(b) 35 per cent under the net cost method; or
(c) 45 per cent under the build-down method.

'

Review of the above information indicates that a finished car imported into
Australia need only satisfy regional value content to receive a preferential tariff
under TPP.39 8 In contrast, all of the car components, except for piston engines,
require either a tariff shift or regional value content. 399 The regional value content
percentages also vary. 400 For vehicles, the minimum percentage is forty-five
percent under the net cost method and fifty-five percent under the build-down
method; for auto parts, there is a general range of minimum percentages from
thirty-five percent to fifty-five percent and the regional value content calculation
method that can be applied.40
From review of the above table, one notices that the product-specific rule of
origin for wire harnesses is particularly lengthy.402 If tariff shift is used, certain

395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See also Appendix I (Provisions Related to the Product-Specific Rules of Origin for Certain
Vehicles and Parts of Vehicles).
398. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System heading 87.0287.05 (passenger vehicles).
399. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses); heading 8703; subheadings 8708.29 (vehicle body parts); 8708.30 (brakes
and parts); 8708.40 (transmissions); 8708.70 (road wheels and parts); 8708.94 (steering wheels);
airbags (8708.95); 8708.99 (miscellaneous motor vehicle parts).
400. Portions of the table above.
401. Id.
402. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses).

2017

CLUB GOODS AND REGULATORY OPPORTUNISM

195

tariff code headings and subheadings are excluded from the calculation; 403 those
same tariff code headings and subheadings are required to be taken into account
when using the regional value content focused value method. 4 04 The specificallyreferenced tariff code headings and sub-headings include insulated and noninsulated wire. 405 For the product-specific rules of origin for wire harnesses in the
above table, three regional value content methods are used, but the net cost method
is not one of them.4 06 In the above table, wire harnesses are the only parts that
include the focused value method in the product-specific rule of origin and the
sixty percent content requirement is higher than the content for any other good
included in the table.4 07 The high originating content requirement under the
focused value method probably is a result of some concern that wire harnesses may
be an auto component likely to be assembled in a non-TPP country. 408 The sixty
percent requirement would permit assembly in a non-TPP country but using a high
content of materials produced in TPP countries. 409
The wire harness is a critical car component that requires some portion of the
assembly to be done by hand. 41 0 An automotive car harness is a collection of wires
bundled together that provide electricity and signals to various areas of the car. 411
The bundling of the wires using some type of sleeve, tape, or other restraint into a
one-piece component has the advantages of being more compact, increasing the
ability to safeguard the electrical system from damage due to vibration, moisture,
or abrasion, decreasing the possibility of a short, decreasing the possibility of fire
through the use of a flame-retardant sleeve, and decreasing the time needed to wire
the car.412 After production, the wire harness must be tested to ascertain that it is
functioning correctly. 413 Although part of the wire harness manufacturing process
can be automated, such as cutting the wires, other portions of the process must be
done by hand.414 A wire harness supplier may have the component manufactured in

403. Id
404. Id.
405. Trans-Pacific Partnership Annex 3-D, at 81-82, 84, 152-55.
406. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses).
407. Id.
408. See CARLOS AYALA, AUTOMOTIVE WIRING HARNESS: MANUFACTURING PROCESS (1999),
http://www.personal.engin.umd.umich.edu/-jwvm/ece539/W99Presentations/WiringHam/AutoHames
s.PDF.
409. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses).
410. AYALA, supra note 408, at 1, 8.
411. Id. atl.
412. Masakazu Kobayashi, Yoshiya Hirano & Masatake Higashi, OptimizationofAssembly
Processesofan Automobile Wire Harness, 11 COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN & APPLICATIONS 305, 305
(2013); Robert Kraus & David Ryan, Advances in Heat-Shrink Technology, 4 IEEE ELECTRICAL
INSULATION MAG. 31, 33 (1988); Austin Weber, A Little Covering Goes a Long Way, WIRE
PROCESSING 12 (Oct. 2016).

413. AYALA, supra note 408, at 11-12.
414. Id.at8, 11-12.
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a location with low labor cost to cut down on its cost of manufacture.
I

415

Differences Between NAFTA and TPP Rules of Origin

Those familiar with NAFTA rules of origin would note the major differences
between NAFTA and TPP rules of origin when determining regional value content.
One difference is that TPP no longer requires tracing of certain non-originating
components.416 Pursuant to the tracing rule, the non-originating status of certain
417
goods was determined at the time a NAFTA party took title. From then on, those
goods had to be traced and they maintained their status as non-originating goods
418
The reason for the tracing rule
throughout the balance of the production process.

was to combat the "roll-up" problem. Roll-up occurs when an auto part contains
some non-originating content but the part is deemed to be originating under the
rules of origin. 41 9 This status of being 100% an originating good continues when
the auto part is incorporated into the finished car. 420 Thus the roll-up may give an
inaccurate picture of the percentage of the car that was produced with materials
originating in countries within the trade agreement.4 21 The auto industry had
lobbied for the tracing rule but no longer supports the rule because of the
administrative burden.422
Another difference between NAFTA and TPP is between applicable
percentages when using regional value content.42 3 For example, NAFTA requires
62.5% originating materials for cars and many parts under the net cost method to
qualify for preferential tariffs.424 Under TPP, the percentage drops to 45% under
the net cost method for cars. 425 For some auto parts, TPP lowers the threshold
percentage to 35% under the net cost method. TPP includes the use of a builddown method that is unavailable under NAFTA.426 The threshold minimum of
originating material is 55% for cars under the build-down method. 427 The builddown method can be used for auto parts, including motor vehicle bodies, road
wheels, radiators, mufflers, exhaust pipes, and clutches, and the threshold
minimum of originating material for those auto parts is 45% .428 The build-up
method can also be used for those same parts, with a threshold minimum of

415. Id.
416.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 236-37.

417. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 403.1.16, H.R. Doc. 103-159, 32
I.L.M. 289, 673 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
418. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Annex 403.1, 403.2, H.R. Doc. 103159, 32 1.L.M. 289, 673 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
419. SCHEWEL, supra note 263.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 237.

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

WU, supranote 36, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2 n.3.
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originating material of 35%.429
The lower percentages lead most analysts to the conclusion that the threshold
percentages are lower under TPP than under NAFTA.430 Japan negotiated for low
threshold minimum percentages for originating materials to accommodate the
country's present practice of outsourcing parts from non-TPP countries, including
China.4 31 The percentage figures contained in TPP for auto goods were a
compromise between Japan and other TPP parties, 432 as some representing
Canadian and Mexican interests had advocated for a minimum fifty percent
originating materials percentage on all auto parts. 433
The beneficiaries of the lower minimum percentages of originating materials
included in TPP depend on several factors. As far as a United States auto company
is concerned, the lower percentages may give an automaker the ability to outsource
auto components from a non-TPP country to save on costs yet still take advantage
of the TPP preferential tariffs. 434 This may mean that a United States third-tier
producer of auto components may face more competition in cost, especially if the
product is a simple one like tires or steel. 435 Producers of complex auto
components or those for which the auto component producer needs to be
geographically close to a higher tier part supplier or automaker likely will be
unaffected. 436 A company with a global footprint may decide to shift some of its
operations to less costly geographical locations; however, a company with a more
local focus may not have that option.437

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF TPP

Geopolitics

Some political scientists employ game theory in analyzing the strategy of
what a country will do in relationship with what the country thinks other countries
will do. 43 8 One theory is that the signing of one free trade agreement may have a
contagion effect leading non-parties to the agreement to sign their own trade
agreement for fear of being left out of the gains the parties to the first trade
agreement, or losing existing markets,439 with "the degree of contagion . . . related
to the importance of the partners' markets."44 0 Another motivation may be for a

429.
430.
431.
432.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.

433. TPP RULE OF ORIGIN is 45%, supranote 38.

434. WU, supra note 36, at 2.
435. SCHEWEL, supra note 263.
436. Wu, supra note 64, at 2-3.
437. TPP RULE OF ORIGIN is 45%, supra note 37.

438. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Brad L. LeVeck, David G. Victor, & James H. Fowler, Decision
Maker Preferencesfor InternationalLegal Cooperation,68 INT'L ORG. 845, 852 (2014).
439. Richard Baldwin & Dany Jaimovich, Are Free Trade Agreements contagious?, 88 J. INT'L

ECON. 1, 1 (2012).
440. Id. at 21.
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country to be in the position to better compete for future foreign direct investment
anticipated to be made in support of the global supply chain for the auto and auto
parts industries."' Although many think that the choice of partners is dependent on
trade, the choice is dependent more on power and politics.442 Economic
interdependence seems to have a positive effect in deterring conflict and promoting
3
peace and security."
TPP is the lead mega-regional 4 " in a region that has spawned a number of
5
concepts in the past for Asian regional integration." The primary Asian regional
association has been the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), with
its original five members, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand, and the addition of Brunei, plus the later addition of four more countries,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, bringing the total countries in ASEAN to
ten." 6 In turn, China has been pressing forward with the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership, comprised of ASEAN+6 (the ASEAN countries plus
"47
Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand).
The TPP itself was an outgrowth of the P4 (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and
Singapore)." 8 When the United States expressed its interest in joining, Australia,
9
Malaysia, Peru, and Vietnam followed shortly thereafter.44 Vietnam has high
tariffs; as a developing country it saw that it could benefit from joining the
45
others 450 and Malaysia did not want to be left out. 1 Canada and Mexico had to
join to be covered on the new measures under TPP that are not covered under
NAFTA.452 Japan had to join; it could not afford to have the United States get a
453
better deal with the other TPP parties than Japan.
Game theory should trigger an examination of the existing trade agreements
between TPP parties and what TPP parties stand to lose if TPP does not go into

441. Id. at l1.
442. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, PoliticalScience Research on
InternationalLaw: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 47, 51-52 (2012).
443. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Alexander H. Montgomery, War, Trade, and Distrust: Why
Trade
Agreements Don'tAlways Keep the Peace, 29 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE ScL 257, 258 (2012).
444. For background on the TPP, see Chunding Li & John Whalley, China and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership:A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved, 37 WORLD ECON. 169, 17073 (2014).
445. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths toward
Deeper Asian Economic Integration,8 ASIAN J. OF WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 359, 361 (2013).
446. Id at n.1, 3.
447. Id.at361-62.
448. Id. at 364; Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader
Trans-PacificPartnership:Implications, Risks and Opportunities,4 ASAN J. OF WTO & INT'L HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 401, 403 (2009).
449. Lewis, supra note 448, at 403.
450. Raj Bhala, Trans-Pacific Partnership or Trampling Poor Partners?A Tentative Critical
Review, I MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L. 2, 19 (2014).
451. CERDEIRO, supra note 17, at 13, 17, 23.
452. Id. at 7.
453. Id. at 8-9.
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effect. Three trade agreements overlap in the Pacific Ocean area of the globe. The
three are TPP, NAFTA, and the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement. 45 4 The three
NAFTA countries, the United States, Canada, and Mexico, are also parties to
TPP.4 55 Of the ten members of ASEAN, only four, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Vietnam, are parties to TPP.456 The six ASEAN members who are not parties
to TPP are Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand.457
As far as ASEAN countries with auto industries, only two, Malaysia and Vietnam,
are parties to TPP; three other ASEAN members with auto industries, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand, are not parties to TPP.458 The auto industries of
Malaysia and Vietnam may receive a boost above the auto industries of Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand because the latter three countries will not receive the
benefits that TPP has to offer. With TPP, the huge United States consumer base
would become more attractive to Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Vietnam.4 59 Chances are that those five countries will export more products to
satisfy the demands of consumers in the United States, as these are the only
countries with which the United States does not currently have a preferential trade
agreement in effect. 460
As far as Latin America is concerned, the United States already has trade
agreements with Chile, Mexico, and Peru.46 1 TPP will strengthen the ties between
the United States and those countries and will update NAFTA.4 62 One study
considered the effect of non-TPP Latin American countries joining TPP.4 3 The
conclusion of the study was that the countries that could see positive results by
becoming TPP members are Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Colombia because
of their current restrictiveness in trade in goods; Argentina and El Salvador are the
countries that would show little effect. 4 64
B.

Economics and TPP

The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) released its analysis
of TPP in May of 2016 and projected positive effects over baseline projections,
although representing a small percentage in comparison with the large size of the
United States economy."4 5 The analysis showed that by 2032, the United States

454.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 695-740.

455. Id. at 703.
456. Id. at 410 n.28.
457. Id. at 19; Lewis, supra note 448, at 410 n.28.
458. HIDEO KOBAYASHI, CURRENT STATE AND ISSUES OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND AUTO PARTS
INDUSTRIES IN ASEAN 1 (2015), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2015-22.pdf.
459. GOTO, supra note 16.

460. Id.
461. CHRISTOPHER WILSON, THE IMPACT OF TPP ON LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH
THE
REGION
(2015),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-impact-tpp-latin-america-and-usrelations-the-region.

462. Id.
463. See CERDEIRO, supra note 17.

464. Id. at 21.
465.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 21.
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will show a $57.3 billion USD increase in annual income (0.23 percent), a $42.7
billion USD increase in gross domestic product (0.15), and an increase in
employment (0.07 percent).' United States exports and imports would rise ($27.2
billion USD or 1.0 percent for exports and $48.9 billion USD or 1.1 percent for
imports).4 67 The analysis considered the effect on United States exports to and
imports from TPP countries that are new partners to free trade agreements with the
United States. 468 The estimates were that United States exports would show an
increase of $34.6 billion USD, or 18.7 percent, and United States imports would
469
show an increase of $23.4 billion USD, or 10.4 percent.
The ITC May 2016 report contained an economic assessment of the United
States auto industry. 470 The overview of the auto industry was positive with growth
47
in imports and exports of United States finished vehicles and vehicle parts. 1 For
2032, the report showed a growth of $1.6 billion USD, or 0.3 percent, in finished
47 2
The
cars but a decrease in auto parts of $1.4 billion USD, or 0.3 percent.
increase in exports is primarily based on exports to Japan and Vietnam. Japan
would contribute to the increase in car imports due to the reduction in United
States tariffs. 4 73 Imports of vehicles and parts from Canada and Mexico are also
projected to increase. 474 The TPP rules of origin for autos are expected to impact
475
The study concludes that the
the United States auto and auto parts industries.
lowering of the regional value content under TPP as compared to NAFTA will
contribute to a rise in the exports of United States autos but a decline in exports of
4 76
Auto industry experts see the
United States auto parts to Canada and Mexico.
regional value content percentages as sufficiently differentiating between
carmakers in TPP and non-TPP countries to lower the likelihood of carmakers in
477
However, there is a
non-TPP countries from taking advantage of the treaty.
perception that the rules of origin that impact auto parts may not be sufficiently
4 78
strong to protect auto parts suppliers in TPP countries.
Another recent economic analysis conducted in Spring of 2016 from the
Peterson Institute for International Economics (Peterson) projects that TPP will
result in benefits, although more significant than those projected by the
International Trade Commission. 4 79 This second analysis predicts that by 2030, the
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incomes of TPP countries will show a $465 billion USD annual increase (1.1
percent) and the exports of TPP countries will show a $1,025 billion USD annual
increase (11.5 percent). 480 The United States economy is projected to have a $131
billion USD boost, in part based on a 9.1 percent increase in exports.4 8 ' Although
the United States is ahead of all TPP countries in the dollar figure gain, Vietnam is
projected to have the largest percentage increase in real income, at 9.1 percent. 482
Other substantial beneficiaries are Japan, Malaysia, and Canada. Trade diversion is
projected to have a slightly negative effect on China.4 83
The projected economic benefits may be different for different economic
groups in the United States. For example, two economists analyzed the effects of
trade on the United States economy for the twenty-year period from 1988 to
2008.484 They found that there was a $720 billion USD benefit due to increased
trade but that competition from imports suppressed wages by $140 billion USD. 485
Although the overall effect was positive, the top twenty percent of United States
households received three-quarters of this gain.4 86 Two other economists analyzed
who are the winners and losers from the effects of trade. 487 They found a "pro-poor
bias of trade."4 88 What that means is that the poorest would lose sixty-three percent
of their purchasing power if the country was closed off from international trade
but, in contrast, the high-income individuals would lose twenty-eight percent. 48 9
The reason for this is that the poorest spend more on goods that are more traded
and the wealthy spend a larger portion of disposable income on services, which are
not so heavily traded. 490 The Peterson Spring 2016 report supports the pro-poor
bias of trade. 4 9 1 Although a common belief is that TPP will benefit the wealthy, the
recent analysis projected that TPP will slightly benefit the middle and lower
classes more than the upper class and will have a substantial beneficial effect on
the poorer developing countries. 492
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Vietnam's inclusion in TPP may have an interesting effect on the United
States and on China. Vietnam's labor costs are twenty percent lower than labor
costs in China and the Vietnamese population is becoming increasingly welleducated.493 Vietnam is reportedly encouraging domestic firms to develop by
protecting them from competition from China. 494 Vietnam may be able to improve
economic efficiency by permitting presently state-owned enterprises to pass into
private hands. The dynamism of the Vietnamese economy may be enhanced if it
receives foreign direct investment.495 In 2014, the United States collected $5.53
billion USD in tariff duties.496 Because Vietnam had no free trade agreement with
497
TPP will benefit
the United States, Vietnam paid 42.9 percent of that amount.
Vietnam by significantly reducing the tariffs that Vietnam pays to the United
States. One estimate is that the reduction in tariffs results in an 8.1 percent increase
in the gross domestic product of Vietnam by the year 2030.498 Vietnam's inclusion
in TPP may result in Vietnam taking over some trade with the United States that
would otherwise go to China. 499 For China, this may result in a zero to 0.1 percent
500
decline in China's gross domestic product.
Economists have been very interested in studying the potential effects of the
1
various regional trade agreements.5 0 China has become a big player in world trade
502
The volume of China's exports has made
with exports fueling its economy.
some countries leery of China because of China's imports competing strongly with
domestic production.50 3 Some have talked about China either joining TPP at some
5
point or becoming an associate member of TPP. 0 One econometric study
examined the effects of China being or not being a participant in TPP.os The study
estimates that China not being a participant in TPP would raise outside demand,
resulting in a growth of the exports and total production of the country, but that
China would decrease imports. 5 In econometric terms, this would be a "welfare
loss," 0 7 but a relatively small one, for China because of the combination of the
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growth in China's exports and the decline in China's imports. The situation would
change if China were to be a participant in TPP. The effect for China as a
participant would be significantly positive.508
V.

CONCLUSION

The TPP is a trade agreement with important geopolitical, strategic
dimensions. 509 The United States continues as the market hegemon in trade. 510 The
TPP is attractive to the United States because it promotes the United States
integration into the Asian region, which holds a large portion of the world's
population and has shown itself to be a region of dynamic economic growth.i1
The United States can better protect the investment interests of multi-national
enterprises headquartered in the United States by having a stronger presence in
Asia. If Congress were not to ratify the TPP, that action could very well signal a
protectionist trend and isolate the United States from being a full participant in
global trade.51 2
The United States needs to show its continuance as a world power in the
region and might provide needed stability in Asia during a time that Asia is
encountering substantial political, economic, and institutional changes. 513 With the
United States solidifying the Asian American block, the world could be dominated
by two blocks - Asian America on one side of the globe and Europe on the
other. 514 The United States needs to become a party to a regional club that includes
Asia during the time that other trade agreements are being negotiated.' 5 The
downside of TPP not being successful is that the United States may be foreclosing
itself from participation in other clubs that might come into being in Asia.516
When considering the auto industry, TPP may have an overall beneficial
effect on the consumer by lowering prices or keeping prices fairly constant even
with rising prices of raw materials and increased safety and gas conservation
requirements; TPP may have a negative effect in certain areas of the country that
lose business because an automaker moves a portion of the manufacturing chain to
another TPP country from the United States. Yet, a multinational enterprise, like a
major automaker, may benefit from lower costs of auto components and the
opening of new markets from the decrease in tariffs. A politician knows that a
small number of people a trade measure affects to a greater extent, such as those in
the auto component portion of the industry losing business, are more politically
effective than a large number of people, such as auto consumers, all affected by a
508. Id.
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smaller amount. The political effectiveness of the smaller group is based on the
fact that those who will lose from the TPP rules of origin for autos will be more
vocal in their objections and are likely to lobby their representatives in Congress.
Another factor is that the vast, but individually small, gains to consumers are
transparent in that consumers typically do not realize that they are benefiting from
a trade agreement in being able to take advantage of lower prices.
An econometric study published in 2014 analyzed the club goods effect of
TPP. The study found that the TPP mostly has a positive effect on the members of
the TPP club, although global free trade has a positive effect on nearly all
countries, with the global free trade benefits considerably exceeding the benefits of
the free trade effects of TPP."' TPP will increase the production, exports, and
imports of all club members, with the largest gains received by the smaller
countries.5 18 For most of the non-club members, exports are estimated to increase
9
and imports to decrease, with a decrease in welfare. 51 The 2014 study is consistent
with the ITC and Peterson econometric analyses from the spring of 2016 as far as
overall benefits are concerned and with the effect on non-club members. A word of
caution is advisable concerning the effect on the suppliers of less complex auto
parts. Those suppliers run the risk of stiff competition from other TPP members
with lower labor costs.
Therefore, the conclusion is that the TPP will have an overall positive effect
on the auto and suppliers of more sophisticated auto parts of the TPP parties.
However, TPP may not have such a positive effect on the suppliers of the less
complex auto parts. The effect of TPP will likely be slightly negative as far as
China's auto and auto parts industries are concerned.
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